Interview : Kenneth Elinzga by Aaron Steelman
RF: When did you and Professor Breit become
interested in using fiction as a way to convey
economic ideas?
Elzinga: Bill and I were in the U.S. Virgin Islands,
on the island of St. John, at a resort called Caneel
Bay Plantation. We were vacationing there with
my wife. At dinner we often discussed the “beach
books” we had been reading. Bill was an avid
reader of mystery fiction, about which I knew
practically nothing, except the Hardy Boys. One
night he described how the genre of mystery
fiction had generated sleuths who used different
methods of analysis to solve crimes. 
As I recall, Bill mentioned Rabbi Small’s use
of the Talmud and Hercule Poirot’s use of psy-
chology as examples. Then he added something
that caught my attention. Bill reported that there
had never been a central character in all of mystery
fiction who used economic reasoning to solve the
crime. I suggested to Bill that he ought to create
such a character. He responded that he would do
so if I agreed to work with him on the project.
You have to understand that Professor Breit is an
unusually creative and witty person. And he is my
best friend. So without giving the matter much
thought, I agreed. And we started brainstorming
about a novel during that vacation. 
I had no idea, at the time, what hard work I
had signed on for and no idea how much enjoy-
ment we also would get from the collaboration.
RF: I have read that the hero of your novels,
Henry Spearman, is modeled loosely after
Milton Friedman. Is that correct?
Elzinga: I’m not sure I would use the word
“loosely.” Our fictional character, Henry Spear-
man, is very much like the real-world Milton
Friedman — certainly in appearance. But not only
in appearance: Over and again, as Bill and I
worked on our three books, we would ask our-
selves what might Milton Friedman say in this sit-
uation. Bill knows Milton much better than I do,
and Bill is a mimic. So I would literally hear what
sounded like Friedman’s voice coming from my
pal as we pondered some idea. 
Now having said that, obviously there are
differences. Henry Spearman teaches at Harvard;
Milton Friedman’s fame as an economist was at the
University of Chicago. Milton Friedman’s wife Rose
is herself a skilled economist. That did not work for
Editor’s Note: This is an abbreviated version of RF’s conversa-
tion with Kenneth Elzinga. For the full interview, go to our Web
site: www.rich.frb.org/pubs/regionfocus.
Many people think economics is boring — certainly not
the stuff of which mystery novels are made. But those
people probably have never heard of Henry Spearman.
He is the hero of three murder mysteries written by
economists Kenneth Elzinga and William Breit: Murder
at the Margin, The Fatal Equilibrium, and AD e a dly
Indifference. (Actually, Elzinga and Breit published those
books under the pseudonym Marshall Jevons, combining
the names of two famous classical economists, Alfred
Marshall and William Stanley Jevons.) Spearman — who
is modeled after Milton Friedman — uses economic
logic to determine who is behind the murders. The
books are both fun and informative. As a reviewer for
the W all Street Journal remarked of Murder at the
Margin, “if there is a more painless way to learn
economic principles, scientists must have recently
discovered how to implant them in ice cream.”
Since 1967, Elzinga has served on the faculty of the
University of Virginia, where Breit also taught from
1965 to 1983. In addition to his murder mysteries,
Elzinga is well known for his work on antitrust issues
and the economics of the beer industry. He is also an
acclaimed instructor, having won several teaching
awards at UVA, and a former president of the
Southern Economic Association. Aaron Steelman
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created a wife for Henry who does
not understand economics, so she
could play the Dr. Watson role.
RF: What difficulties did you
encounter in finding a publisher
for your first novel, Murder at
the Margin?
Elzinga: Publishing a work of
fiction is a classic chicken-and-egg
problem. Once you have published a successful first
novel, publishers are interested in considering your
second book. You have a track record as an author.
But until that first novel is out, no one seems
interested.
Almost every successful author has a story of
how he or she almost never got published. In our
case, after being rejected by a number of publish-
ers, a small publishing house that had brought out
a couple of books by Milton Friedman and Paul
Samuelson became interested because of the Milton
Friedman-Henry Spearman nexus. This publisher
took our manuscript for Murder at the Margin to
Paul Samuelson at MIT and told us that if Pro-
fessor Samuelson liked it, he would publish it. And
so our fate hinged on what Samuelson thought of
a book whose hero was patterned after Friedman. 
Our first break was that Samuelson liked the
manuscript. It turned out that his MITcolleague,
Bob Solow, also became a fan. Another fan we have
is John Nash. So we have a number of Nobel Lau-
reates who like the exploits of Henry Spearman. 
Our second big break was that the Wall Street
Journal reviewed Murder at the Margin and gave it
a great review. Alot of people read the Journal and
a lot of them bought the book. Those two breaks
in large part explain how we came to write The
Fatal Equilibrium and AD eadly Indifference.
RF: If I may put your fiction writing in a dif-
ferent category, much of your academic work
has focused on antitrust. How would you
describe the evolution of economic thinking
about antitrust over the past 30 years?
Elzinga:The biggest change is the enormous in-
terjection of economic analysis into antitrust en-
forcement and policy. Every assistant attorney gen-
eral heading the Antitrust Division, whether the











many years, the only people to hold the deputy as-
sistant attorney general rank at the Department of
Justice were attorneys. This is just one snippet of a
profound change in economic influence. 
Any major antitrust case today has economists
involved. Cases being considered by either the
Federal Trade Commission or the Antitrust Divi-
sion are now always assessed by economists along
with attorneys. In antitrust trials, economists now
play an important testifying role.
The intellectual stimulus for much of this has
its locus at the University of Chicago, where Aaron
Director and others began applying economic
analysis to the law, including antitrust law. There
is more to the story than what was happening in
Hyde Park, to be sure. But the Chicago School of
Economics has had an enormous impact on the
way antitrust is considered. Even critics of the
Chicago School have to understand its influence
to offer their critique.
RF: Aspiring monopolists are often accused of
using predatory pricing to drive competitors from
the market. In the case of foreign trade, the
United States has tried to stop that behavior
through the enforcement of anti-dumping laws.
What is your view of U.S. anti-dumping laws?
Elzinga: Like most economists, I can restrain my
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and a lot to do with rent-seeking by domestic pro-
ducers of goods seeking import protection. I
admire U.S. companies that face import competi-
tion and do not hire lawyers and lobbyists to
protect them from foreign competition.
To  win a dumping case, a domestic producer need
not show that the foreign producer is engaging in
predatory pricing. If that were the requirement, there
would be little to fear from anti-dumping enforce-
ment since very few, if any, foreign producers have
even the remote prospect of gaining a monopoly po-
sition on sales in the United States through below-
cost pricing.
In fact, the economics of predatory pricing as
applied to antitrust enforcement is one of the
great victories of the Chicago School. One of the
most interesting antitrust cases in which I ever
participated was








served as the eco-
nomic expert for the
Japanese defendant,
and I had the chance
to see the insides of
a prominent preda-
tory pricing case.
The case went to
the Supreme Court
where the majority showed their understanding
of how unusual it is for predatory pricing to be a
viable monopolizing strategy. The Court ruled that
predatory pricing was “rarely tried and even more
rarely successful.” I think those are the exact
words of the Court. And, of course, even with
their Court victory in hand, the Japanese never
monopolized the sale of television sets in the
United States. I think, today, the largest seller of
television sets in Japan is a Chinese firm! Mean-
while the American consumer has enjoyed a steady
stream of competitive benefits in consumer elec-
tronic products.
RF: Some economists have argued that there can
be no such thing as monopoly in a purely free
market — that all monopolies result from grants
of government privilege. What do you think of
that argument?
Elzinga: That’s an argument that has an impor-
tant lineage in economics. Today, the argument is
held and put forth most cogently by members of
the Austrian School. I admire a lot about Austrian
economics, and I consider it a shame that most
departments of economics do not offer more
opportunities for students to study Austrian eco-
nomics. Moreover, I think the argument that all
monopolies result from grants of government priv-
ilege teaches an important point. The point being:
Markets are largely self-correcting, and that
cartelization and monopolization are not easily
pulled off, notwithstanding the conventional
wisdom (outside of economics) to the contrary.
The problem is the Austrian thesis borders on
being too clever by half.
The real issue is whether the market failure of
monopolies and cartels can be identified and reme-
died by a government agency at less cost than that
inflicted by monopolies and cartels upon consumers
before the monopolies or cartels are undermined
by new entry or cheating or technological change. 
When I teach microeconomic principles at the
University of Virginia, and I come to cartel theory,
I always teach about the instability of cartels
because of the cheater problem. It is a powerful
theory and there is much truth to it. But I had an
opportunity to study the recent vitamin cartel and
this cartel operated for more than 10 years, seem-
ingly without government protection or privilege.
I’m grateful that the antitrust authorities finally
caught the cartel members and that antitrust penal-
ties seek to deter such conduct by other firms.
Aside from cartels, I think if the United States
did not have an antimerger law the country would
go through a wave of mergers-to-monopoly. Over
time, the anticompetitive effects of these mergers
might dissipate through new entry. But we have a
merger law that allows mergers that are efficiency-
driven, and that involve an otherwise failing firm.
I’m not sure why consumers should have to wait
for the long run to come around when economics
provides pretty good guidance of what kinds of
horizontal mergers we should try to nip in the bud.
RF: You have done a good deal of research and
writing on the economics of the brewing indus-
try. What do you think of the rise of “micro-
brews” in recent years?
Elzinga: I have watched the rise of microbrew-
eries with interest, going back to Mr. Fritz
Maytag’s pioneering efforts with Anchor Steam
Beer, beginning in the mid-1960s. Microbreweries
still supply only a small share of the beer market
compared to the major domestic brewers and the
importers. But they have added to consumer
welfare by bringing new flavors and product
Anti-dumping laws have
little or nothing to do
with genuine predatory
pricing and a lot to do
with rent-seeking by
domestic producers.
38 Region Focus • Summer 2004
Region Focus Summer 04.ps - 7/12/2004 3:52 PMvariety to the marketplace. And in the process, a
place has been made for a group of entrepreneurs
to make some money (not all have) and to produce
a product for which they have a passion. 
Let me mention, however, that to my mind an
equally important development in the American
beer market has been the place at the table that
import brands now have, particularly the Mexi-
cans, and especially Corona. It would have taken
a remarkable crystal ball to predict, a decade ago,
that a Mexican beer would not just be a fringe
supplier, but a top-10 seller.
RF: You have written on the relationship
between religion and economics. Many religious
people are often hostile to the market system
because they believe that markets ignore issues
of social justice. Why do you think such con-
cerns are prevalent among people of faith?
Elzinga: I am not sure I have a particularly good
answer to that question, but I’ll hazard three
reasons why so many religious people are hostile to
market allocation.
First, we need to realize that many people,
perhaps especially seminarians, simply do not
understand what Adam Smith called “the obvious
and simple system of natural liberty.” They do not
find the benefits of, indeed the genius of, the market
system to be obvious and simple. Incidentally, many
of my students at the University of Virginia are the
same way. 
Many people who have not had so much as one
course in economics are confident of their ability to
opine on economic subjects. That said, there are
clergy who do understand the hidden logic of
economic analysis. I admire the work of Father
Robert Sirico at the Acton Institute for the Study of
Religion and Liberty in Grand Rapids, Mich. He and
others are doing pioneering and important work in
bringing knowledge of how markets work to clergy
and seminarians.
Second, we need to acknowledge that many people
do not like the spirit of enterprise that is part of the
market system. There are many members of the
intellectual class who admire the creativity of writing
a poem or composing music. And rightly so. But many
of these same people will not admire the creativity
involved in coming up with a new product, a new
service, or a new form of business organization. Ask
yourself this question: Have you ever observed a
writer in an important journal or newspaper object
to the substantial earnings of an entertainer? I haven’t.
But the earnings of business entrepreneurs are
regularly viewed as somehow suspect, undeserved, or
undertaxed.
Third, people of faith often are marked by a
deep concern for the poor and oppressed. Now the
world was full of poor and oppressed people long
before the development of the modern market
system. Markets have made possible the prospect
of the bulk of an economy’s popula-
tion not being poor and oppressed.
Paradoxically, it is the very success
of the market system that tempts
those who believe in a preferential
option for the poor also to believe
that if the government were to step
in, some kind of mopping-up action
would take place and we could end
all poverty.
To  my mind, the sad thing about
many churches is that they have
abdicated the responsibility to help
the poor, and explicitly or implicitly
invited the state to take over the role
of compassion. One of the most
remarkable things I have ever read
was by Peter Bauer, the great scholar
of economic development who did
so much to teach economists how
counterproductive government-to-
government aid is in helping the
poor in other nations. Bauer was
asked in an interview what a person
who wanted to help the poor in a
less developed country should do.
His response: Give your money to a
missionary working in that country.
RF: Which economists have influ-
enced you the most?
Elzinga: I would have to mention
first, Professor Sherrill Cleland, my
first undergraduate teacher in eco-
nomics. He influenced me to major
in economics and then pursue a
career in college teaching. In one
sense, he influenced me the most
because he believed I could be an
economist at a time when my goal
had been to work in the sporting-goods industry.
Professor Walter Adams at Michigan State was
the graduate mentor who influenced me a great
deal. He gave me a passion to study and under-
stand the institution of antitrust. My colleague
Bill Breit influenced me enormously at Virginia,
not only as a co-author, but as a teacher. Bill never
thought that teaching and research had to be
mutually exclusive. Finally, Professor Ronald Coase
invited me to spend time at the University of
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